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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Enrique Gracia 
Appellant, 
vs. 
State of Utah 
Appellee, 
) Case No. 981299 
) Priority No. 2 
-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant, Enrique Gracia, appeals from a jury verdict which 
found him guilty of one second degree felony charge and one class 
A misdemeanor charge. The trial was held in front of the 
Honorable Lynn W. Davis, Judge, Fourth District Court, Utah 
County, State of Utah. The verdict of guilt was entered by the 
court on March 13, 1998 and the defendant was sentenced on May 
18, 1998 to a term of 1-15 years at the Utah State Prison to be 
stayed upon his completion of 2 00 days in the Utah County Jail 
and 3 6 months of probation. The Appellant filed his notice of 
appeal in a timely fashion. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(e). 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
WITH STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Iggue I 
Did the court commit error as a matter of law by allowing 
hearsay evidence of laboratory test results to be admitted into 
evidence without requiring a legal basis for the admission of the 
hearsay information? 
Standard of Review for Issue I 
In general, trial courts are granted broad discretion in 
admitting or excluding evidence. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 
(Utah 1994). However, a decision on whether or not to admit 
evidence is often the "Sum of several rulings each of which may 
be reviewed under a separate standard. " State v. Thurman, 84 6 
P.2d 1256, 1270 (Utah 1993). In the case of business records, a 
proper foundation must be laid by the proponent of the records. 
If the trial court does not require that foundation be laid to 
establish the necessary reliability, the court's decision is a 
matter of law which should be reviewed for correctness. See 
State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1983), Trolley Square 
Associates v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 66-67 (Utah App. 1994) . 
Issue II 
Did the court err as a matter of law denying Gracia of his 
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right to confrontation by allowing hearsay information concerning 
laboratory test results to be admitted into evidence when the 
court did not determine that the witnesses who tested the 
specimen were unavailable and the court did not determine that 
the information had a sufficient indicia of reliability? 
Standard of Review for Issue II 
When a defendant's right to confrontation is at issue a two 
pronged test must be used by a court to determine whether prior 
hearsay testimony should be admitted. A failure by a court to 
apply this test is a question of law which should be reviewed for 
correctness. See, State v. Brooks. 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981), See 
also, Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
Issue III 
Did the court commit error as a matter of law by allowing 
laboratory test results performed on Gracia's urine specimen to 
be admitted into evidence without requiring the state to present 
adequate evidence for the court to consider the circumstances 
surrounding the custody of the urine specimen and the likelihood 
of tampering? 
Standard of Review for Issue III 
While abuse of discretion is the proper standard for 
evidentiary rulings which require a balancing of factors, 
individual legal determinations which are part of an overall 
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evidentiary ruling are reviewed under the correction of error 
standard. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1222 n.2 (Utah 1993). 
Issue iv 
In the alternative to Issue III, did the court abuse its 
discretion by allowing the State to introduce test results into 
evidence when none of the six people who handled and tested the 
urine specimen testified and the sole witness for the chain of 
custody was the lab supervisor who did not handle or test the 
specimen? 
Standard of Review for Issue IV 
If after consideration of the circumstances surrounding the 
custody of an article and the likelihood of tampering these 
factors the court is satisfied that the substance has not been 
changed or altered it may permit its introduction into evidence. 
Such decisions regarding the introduction of evidence will be 
overtured only upon a showing that the court abused its 
discretion. State v. Madsen. 28 Utah 2d 108, 110-111, 498 P.2d 
670, 672 (1972). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following Utah statutes are determinative in this 
action: 
4 
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Utah Code Ann^§78-2a-3<e) 
Constitution of Utah Article 1 Section 12 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
Utah Rule of Evidence 802 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
On April 18, 1997, the State of Utah filed an information 
alleging that the defendant, Enrique Gracia, Possessed or used 
Cocaine in a drug free zone, a second degree felony and 
unlawfully possessed drug paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a 
class A misdemeanor. The matter proceeded to trial by jury. 
B. Court of the Proceedings 
A Jury Trial was held on March 11 and March 13, 1998 in the 
Fourth District Court in front of the Honorable Lynn W. Davis. 
C. Disposition at Trial Court 
The Jury returned a Verdict of guilty which was entered by 
the court on March 13, 1998. The Defendant was sentenced by the 
Court on May 18, 1998 to 1-15 years in the Utah State Prison. 
The Prison sentence was stayed upon Defendant's completion of 200 
days in the Utah County Jail and 3 6 months probation. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
In the early hours of April 12, 1997, Officer Butterfield 
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and Officer Mangleson of the Lehi Police Department received a 
dispatch that there was a dispute or possibly a fight between 
some roommates at 455 West Main Street in Lehi. (R. 229-230) 
Upon arriving at the scene they observed four males arguing 
in a parking lot of an apartment complex, one of whom was later 
identified as appellant, Enrique Gracia (Gracia). (R. 230-231) 
At the scene Officer Butterfield noticed one of the 
individuals, later identified as Russell Allen, push Mr. Gracia 
and that another of the individuals, later identified as Scott 
Allen, was carrying a baseball bat. (R.179, 232) He also noticed 
a female individual, later identified as Russell and Scott 
Allen's mother, Joanne Faust and another individual later 
identified at Mark Harris. (R. 233) 
The arguing individuals were standing at the head of a 
flight of stairs which led to a basement apartment with its door 
open. After inspecting the scene Officer Butterfield decided to 
separate the individuals in the hopes of calming them down. 
Enrique then went in the apartment, followed by the rest of the 
group and Officer Butterfield. (R. 233) 
While in the apartment Officer Butterfield was informed by 
Scott Allen and Mark Harris, that Gracia had attempted to flush 
bindles of drugs down the toilet and that the toilet had 
subsequently clogged and overflowed. (R.234-23 5) 
Officer Butterfield then went into the bathroom and observed 
some small balloon-like containers on the floor at which time he 
called dispatch and had them page Detective Harold Terry to come 
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and assist him.(R.235-236) 
Following his page to Detective Terry, Gracia asked Officer 
Butterfield to accompany him into his bedroom so that they could 
talk privately about the incident. Gracia indicated that there 
was a lot of confusion and that he felt that the other 
individuals were not allowing him to speak, therefore, he would 
feel more comfortable speaking with the Officer in the privacy of 
his own room. (R.23 6) 
Officer Butterfield and Gracia entered Gracia's bedroom. 
Officer Butterfield asked Gracia about the balloons and Gracia 
indicated that he knew nothing about them. While speaking with 
Gracia, Officer Butterfield noticed what looked like a marijuana 
pipe--a pop can with holes in it. Officer Butterfield picked up 
the can and observed residue. (R. 23 8) He asked Gracia if the can 
was his and Gracia indicated that it was not. (R.250) 
Detective Terry and Officer Gordon Smith arrived and met 
with Officer Butterfield in the living room. Officer Butterfield 
described to Terry what he had seen in Gracia's bedroom and 
showed him the bindles in the bathroom. The determination was 
made to arrest Gracia. (R. 239, 260, 290) 
Detective Terry spoke with Russell Allen, Scott Allen, Mark 
Harris, Joann Faust, and Gracia. Gracia explained that the drugs 
were not his, and that someone else placed them in the bathroom. 
(R. 279) Gracia was arrested, transported to the police station. 
(R. 267) 
Gracia!s bedroom was searched and the officers found a pipe, 
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butane and cigarette lighters, a hemostat, a box of baking soda, 
plastic baggies with residue, a rolled up dollar bill, and a 
spoon with residue on it. They seized these items along with the 
pop can that Officer Butterfield had seen earlier. (R. 239-243, 
292-293) 
Detective Terry took the balloons from the bathroom and the 
items seized from the bedroom to the Lehi Police Department where 
he logged it in, put it in a sack, and then placed it in a locked 
bin for the evidence custodian, Sergeant James Munson. (R. 270-
271) Sergeant Munson then transported the evidence to the Utah 
State Crime Lab and after it had been released, he transported it 
back to Lehi. (R. 298) 
While conducting his investigation detective Terry learned 
that Gracia was on probation for Misdemeanor Theft (R.271, 282). 
Terry called Adult Probation and Parole's twenty four hour line, 
learned that John Perry was Mr. Gracia"s Probation Officer, and 
asked Perry to come to the crime scene. (R 271-272) 
Perry arrived at the scene and Detective Terry showed him 
what he and Officer Butterfield had found. Perry authorized the 
police to search Gracia's room pursuant to Gracia's probation 
status. 
Perry then went to where Gracia was being held and 
collected a urine sample from Gracia. (R. Vol II 36-37) After 
collecting the urine sample, Perry transported the sample to 
Adult Probation and Parole, where he sealed it, labeled it with 
his name, Gracia's name, and the date and time the sample was 
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collected, he then put the sample in a refrigerator located in 
his office. (R. Vol II 38) 
Later Perry removed the seal from the cup and poured a 
sample into a container provided by Associated Regional and 
University Pathologists "ARUP", a private laboratory in Salt Lake 
City. Perry took the sample to ARUP and requested that they test 
the sample for cocaine. Perry gave the sample to a technician at 
the lab, where it was numbered, and initialed with Perry's 
initials. (R Vol II 40-42) 
On April 18, 1997 an Information was filed in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court charging Enrique Gracia with Possessing 
or Using Cocaine in a Drug Free Zone, a Second Degree Felony, and 
Unlawfully Possessing Drug Paraphernalia in a Drug Free Zone, a 
Class A Misdemeanor. 
A Preliminary Hearing was held in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court before the Honorable Judge Lynn W. Davis on June 
30, 1998. The State did not call anyone from ARUP to testify at 
the preliminary hearing. The Court found that there was probable 
cause and bound the case over for trial. 
Trial was held on March 11 and 13, 1998. On March 11, 1998 
the State, called Scott Allen (R. 141) Allen Testified that he 
had seen Gracia throw the cocaine into the toilet. On cross 
examination, Richard Gale, Gracia's attorney, asked Allen if he 
had talked to Enrique Gracia following his arrest. Allen 
indicated that he had not. Mr. Gale asked Allen if he had ever 
left threatening messages on Gracia's answering machine, Allen 
9 
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again indicated that he had not. (R. 194) Mr. Gale read a 
transcription of a message that was left on Gracia's answering 
machine and asked Mr. Allen if he had left the message on 
Gracia's answering machine. Allen again denied leaving any 
message and said that he had no reason to call him. (R. 194, 
196) Allen indicate that he was angry with Gracia on the day of 
the incident but that he did not "plant" the drugs in an effort 
to hurt Gracia. (R. 194-197) 
The next day of trial, March 13, 1998, Mr. Gale called Scott 
Allen to testify and asked him again if he had aver left messages 
on Mr. Gracia's answering machine. Scott indicated again, that 
he did not. (R. Vol II 121). 
Richard Gale then called Gracia to the stand. He questioned 
Gracia about how many times he had seen Scott Allen since the 
incident. Gracia indicated that it had been more than ten times. 
Mr. Gale asked Gracia if he had ever received a answering machine 
message from Scott Allen, Gracia indicated that on the 20th of 
April, 1997 he had received a threatening message from Allen on 
his answering machine. Mr. Gale then played the tape of the 
answering machine message. (R. Vol II 130) 
Scott Allen was brought into the courtroom so that he could 
listen to the tape. Mr. Gracia indicated that he believed the 
voice was of Scott Allen's. (R. Vol II 131) 
Scott Allen was then called again to testify, he testified 
that he had left the message but had forgotten about leaving it. 
At the end of the first day of trial, after the jury had 
10 
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been dismissed, the Court went on record to discuss the 
admissibility of Mr. Gracia's urine test. (R.3 02) The Court 
stated that Defense Counsel had indicated to him that they would 
not be calling Mr. Gracia as a witness, and that the Court 
thought that the results of the blood test would probably be best 
reserved for impeachment depending on what the defendant would 
testify to. (R. 302) 
The State argued that the jury had been told about the 
balloons on the bathroom floor and how they got there and that 
above and beyond the balloons sitting on the floor, that the 
State had to prove how they got there. The State argued that 
they established a link with the balloons to the paraphernalia 
found in the bedroom and that they wanted the jury to hear that 
they had the "innermost connection that you can have," that 
cocaine was found in Gracia's system. (R. 303) The State argued 
further that if the Court was to accept the evidence, it would 
certainly be specific evidence that would go to who possessed the 
balloons. (R. 304) 
The State indicated that they wanted to call a lab 
technician from ARUP to testify about very scientifically 
accepted tests, like the gas chromatograph mass spectrometer test 
in order to admit the test results performed on urine. (R. 3 04-
305) 
Mr. Gale objected and stated that he thought there was 
insufficient foundation for the laboratory test results to be 
admitted into evidence.(R.3 05) 
11 
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The Court decided to call the individual from ARUP and argue 
the established facts after he had testified. (R. 305) 
The State called Gordon J. Nelson from the ARUP Laboratory. 
Prior to asking any questions the state referred the court to the 
case of State v. Wynia. 
The State argued that pursuant to State v. Wynia the 
circumstances surrounding the likelihood of tampering are likely 
factors in determining evidence admitted and that if, after 
consideration of these factors, the Court is satisfied that the 
substance has not been changed or altered, that it may permit its 
introduction into evidence. He then stated that the ruling of 
the Court would not be overturned, unless there was a showing of 
an abuse of discretion. (R 307) The State then remarked that the 
Appellate Court has said that once the evidence is in the hand's 
of the State, that such evidence is generally presumed to be 
handled with regularity, absent an affirmative showing of bad 
faith or actual tampering. (R. 307) 
Mr. Gale then indicated to the Court that he thought State 
v. Wynia was very distinguishable from the case that was before 
the Court at that time. Mr. Gale stated that in Wynia the 
Appellant was contesting the chain of custody because the 
individual in the Crime Lab who actually opened the container and 
tested the substance did not say that he had received the sample 
from the individual who accepted it at the Crime Lab.(R. 3 08) Mr. 
Gale then contended that the present case was completely 
different, Gracia was objecting to the fact that Mr. Gordon 
12 
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Nelson was not the person who opened the substance, broke the 
seal, or the one that tested the substance. 
Mr. Gale then stated that prior to the proceedings, he had 
spoken with Mr. Nelson in the presence of the state and that Mr. 
Nelson informed him that there were three people who had handled 
the specimen while it was at the laboratory. One person opened 
the specimen, one person retrieved the specimen from the security 
bag, and one person conducted a preliminary test on the sample. 
Another person then conducted a confirmatory test. (R. 3 08) Mr. 
Gale then stated that none of the three individuals who handled 
and tested the specimen where present in the courtroom. (R. 3 08-
309) 
Mr. Gale argued that Gracia could not explore the 
circumstances surrounding the custody of the specimen or whether 
the specimen had been tampered with because none of the three 
individuals who had possession of the substance were there to 
testify. (R. 309) 
Mr. Gale also argued that in Wynia, "they did testify that 
the evidence was sealed. Sealed, unopened envelopes with the 
appropriate identifying marks strongly indicating that the 
evidence was in its original form." (R. 310) 
Mr. Gale also argued that in the present case there was no 
one there to testify to the fact that they had themselves tested 
the specimen. (R. 310) 
The Court then decided to listen to the witness and 
establish the facts after he had testified. All parties agreed 
13 
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that Mr. Nelson was an expert and he was sworn in. (R.312) 
Mr. Nelson testified about his education, work experience, 
testing policies at the lab, the kinds of tests located at the 
lab, and about the number of employees at the lab. (R.312-315) 
Mr. Gale interrupted the witness and indicated to the Court 
that he did not dispute the validity of the tests, but instead 
was concerned about the chain of custody with the sample. (R.315) 
Mr. Nelson then testified more extensively about the testing 
of samples and the equipment used to test such samples. (R. 316-
320) 
Mr. Nelson also testified about records that are kept which 
identify all individuals that handled the sample. He testified 
that according to his records, that an individual by the name of 
Stacey Szareck had been the one that received the sample. (R.3 22) 
Mr. Nelson then testified that 'Ms. Szareck was no longer working 
at the lab and that she was not the one who tested the sample. 
(R. 322-323) 
Mr. Nelson explained about the chain of custody records kept 
at the lab. Mr. Nielsen testified that through his examination 
of the chain of custody record he felt that the tests were done 
appropriately. (R.326) 
Following Mr. Nielsen's testimony, the court ruled that the 
State had not yet met its burden in terms of foundation. He 
stated that Mr. Nelson was not acquainted with the individuals 
who conducted the tests and whether or not their qualifications 
met the Federal Guidelines. 
14 
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The Court then directed the State that it would be in their 
best interest to have the individuals that handled the sample to 
come in and testify. He also stated that he would make a ruling 
the next day. (R. 358-363) 
On March 13, 1998, outside of the jury's presence, the judge 
went on record to hear the argument's of the parties before he 
made his ruling. (R. Vol II 5) 
The state proffered to the Court that the following 
individuals were involved with the sample: Stacy Szarek, who 
received the sample from the probation officer, Stephanie Brown 
accessed the sample, who released the sample to Maria Chacone, 
who performed the initial test. Next was Glenn Eldridge and Don 
Nash, who deal with all positive result samples, then Teresa Lee, 
and then lastly, Charles Jones, who runs the second test. After 
the second test it was then taken off the machine by Aiping Liu, 
who then reviewed the data.(R. Vol II 6-9). 
Mr. Gale argued that he objected to Mr. Nelson testifying, 
because his testimony would be insufficient to establish chain of 
custody for the urine sample. He stated that the people who 
broke the seal, who handled and open sample and conducted the 
tests were not present to testify, and that the defense did not 
have a chance to cross-examine. (R. Vol II 12-13) 
Mr. Gale asserted that six people handled the opened sample, 
and that none of them were there, and that by allowing Mr. Nelson 
to testify, it violated Mr. Gracia's right to confrontation as 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
15 
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United States and Article I section 12 of the Constitution of 
the State of Utah. (R. Vol II 14) 
He went on further to say that Mr. Gracia does not have the 
opportunity to confront these witnesses, to cross-examine them, 
or to find out why Ms. Szarek was released and whether it was for 
tampering with the samples. (R. Vol II 14) 
Finally, Mr. Gale argued that any information provided by 
Mr. Nelson would be hearsay information read off of a piece of 
paper. (R. Vol II 14) 
The Court then ruled that Gordon Nelson would be allowed to 
testify to the chain of custody and that the positive test 
results performed on the urine sample would be admitted into 
evidence. (R. Vol II 18) 
Following the courts ruling the court heard testimony from 
Gordon Nielsen, and John Perry, Gracia's probation officer. 
After three hours of deliberation, the jury returned with a 
guilty verdict and the Court set the matter for sentencing on 
April 27, 1998. 
On April 27, 1998 Gracia was sentenced to serve a term of 
one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison, the execution of 
the sentence was stayed, and Mr. Gracia was orderd to serve a 
term of two hundred days in the Utah County Jail and to complete 
3 6 months of supervised probation. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Gracia contends that the trial court erred as a matter of 
law in three areas or in the alternative abused its discretion. 
These errors or abuse of discretion by the court resulted in 
prejudicial error and Gracia's conviction. 
First, Gracia contends the trial court erred by allowing 
hearsay information regarding laboratory test results performed 
on a urine specimen to be admitted into evidence. The court 
admitted the hearsay information when no exception to the hearsay 
rule was presented by the State and the state did not present 
adequate foundation for the court to allow admission of the 
hearsay information. 
Second, Gracia contends that in admitting into evidence 
hearsay information regarding laboratory test results, the trial 
court deprived Gracia of his right to confrontation as provided 
by the Sixth amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
and Article I section 12 of the Constitution of Utah. The trial 
court committed this error by admitting the hearsay test results 
into evidence without making the factual determinations necessary 
to overcome Gracia's right to confrontation. Before admitting 
the hearsay information the court should have made a factual 
determination that the six people who tested and handled the 
urine specimen were unavailable and a factual determination that 
the hearsay information bore a sufficient indicia of reliability. 
Third, Gracia contends that the trial court erred as a 
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matter of law in allowing the test results to be admitted into 
evidence because the court did not have testimony through which 
the court could determine the circumstances surrounding the 
custody of the urine specimen and the likelihood of tampering. 
The only evidence the court heard regarding the custody of the 
specimen and the likelihood of tampering was inadmissable 
hearsay. 
Fourth, Gracia contends that even if the hearsay evidence 
presented by the state was sufficient for the court to consider 
the circumstances surrounding the custody of the urine specimen 
and the likelihood of tampering, the court abused its discretion. 
The court abused its discretion by allowing the hearsay test 
results into evidence when the six people in the lab who handled 
and tested the specimen did not testify. 
Lastly, Gracia contends that such errors or abuses by the 
court were prejudicial because the State relied on the hearsay 
information so that they could argue to the jury that cocaine was 
found in Gracia!s urine and therefore Gracia was guilty of 
possessing other bindles of cocaine. Other testimony and 
evidence which connected Gracia to the bindles of cocaine was 
shown by Gracia to be unreliable and biased. Moreover, Gracia 
had not planned on testifying in his own behalf and decided that 
it would be necessary to testify following the court's admission 
of the hearsay test results. 
18 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY ALLOWING 
HEARSAY INFORMATION CONCERNING LABORATORY TEST RESULTS 
PERFORMED ON A URINE TO BE ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE 
Gracia contends that the court erred by admitting hearsay 
information regarding the laboratory test performed on a urine 
specimen into evidence. The court admitted the hearsay into 
evidence without providing a legal basis for the admission. No 
exception to the hearsay rule was presented by the State nor was 
adequate foundation presented to permit the court to allow 
admission of the hearsay. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 802 Provides: "Hearsay is not 
admissible except as provided by law or by these rules." U.R.E. 
802. 
In the present case Gracia objected to the court admitting 
the hearsay information concerning the laboratory test results 
performed on a urine specimen. (R. Vol. 11,13, 19-25; 14, 1-21). 
Notwithstanding Gracia's objection, the court admitted the 
hearsay information into evidence. The admitted the hearsay 
without citing a provision of law or rule of evidence through 
which the hearsay should be allowed. (R. Vol. II 17, 5-25; 18-
19; 20, 1-20). Furthermore, there is no exception to the hearsay 
rule which was relevant or would have allowed the court to admit 
the test results. 
Presumably the state will argue that the hearsay information 
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should have been allowed under one of the exceptions to the 
hearsay rule. However, for evidence to be admissible under an 
exception to the hearsay rule, foundation must be laid to 
establish the necessary indicia of reliability. State v. Bertul. 
664 P.2d 1181. 
In the present case no foundational findings were made by 
the court. At the close of the first day of trial the court 
indicated that the state had not laid the proper foundation for 
the hearsay information to be admitted into evidence and that the 
state should attempt to subpoena the individuals that handled the 
evidence in the laboratory so that they could testify on the 
second day of trial. (R. Vol I, 360, 7-25). However, on the 
second day of trial the court recieved a proffer of hearsay 
information from the state. The state used the proffer in an 
effort to establish sufficent foundation for the court to allow 
the hearsay laboratory results. Following the profer by the 
state.and over Gracia's objection, the court allowed the hearsay 
information to be admitted into evidence and the labratory test 
results to be presented to the jury. The proffer of hearsay 
information by the state did not provide any additional 
foundation as to the reliability of the hearsay. The proffer 
simply provided the names and educational qualifications of the 
individuals who handled and tested the specimen in the 
laboratory. (R. Vol. 11,6, 10-25, 8-23). The information 
provided by the state did not establish that the test results 
were made in the regular course of business, when the hearsay was 
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recorded or by whom, Whether the hearsay information was kept 
under circumstances that would preserve its integrity, or any 
other guarantees of trustworthiness. Moreover, the court did not 
make any findings necessary to establish the required foundation 
for any exception to the hearsay rule. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND DEPRIVED 
GRACIA OF HIS RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION BY ADMITTING 
HEARSAY LABORATORY TEST RESULTS INTO EVIDENCE 
The trial court erred as amatter of law when it allowed 
labratory test results to be admitted into evidence through 
hearsay although there were six people who handled and tested the 
urine specimen in the labratory. Five of the six people's 
wherabouts were known by the state but were not called upon to 
testify. Gracia never had an opportunity to cross examine any of 
these six people on the circumstances surrounding the custody or 
testing of the urine specimen. Therefore, the court deprived 
Gracia of his right to confrontation as provided by the Sixth 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article I 
section 12 of the Constitution of Utah by admitting hearsay test 
results into evidence. 
In determining how prior testimony is to be weighed against 
confrontation concerns, the United States Supreme Court outlined 
a two-pronged test. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). This 
two-pronged test was adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in the 
case of State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981). In Brooks, 
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the court indicated that for prior testimony to be admitted 
through hearsay: first, "the witness must be unavailable" and 
second, "the testimony must bear sufficient indicia of 
reliability to permit its introduction at trial." Id.r at 539. 
Generally, a witness is unavailable for confrontaion purposes 
when the state has made a good faith effort to obtain [the 
witnesses] presence. State v. Oniskor, 29 Utah 2d 395 (1973). 
In Brooks, the court allowed the prior testimony of two 
transients who had testified at a preliminary hearing to be heard 
at trial. In making its decision, the Brooks court determined 
that the two individuals could not be located by the state to 
testify at trial and the prior testimony of the two individuals 
at the preliminary hearing bore sufficient indicia of 
reliability. Id.. at 542. 
In determining that the individuals in Brooks were not 
available to testify, the court considered the fact that a police 
officer had made a good faith effort to locate the witnesses. 
Id., at 540. The police officer testified that he had contacted 
all known relatives, likely hangouts, the local bus terminals and 
out of state police but could not locate the individuals. 
In contrast to Brooks. the state in the present case knew 
exactly where five of the six missing witnesses could be located. 
(R. Vol. II, 10,3-25; 11, 1-15). The witness who the state had 
not located, Stacey Szarek, was no longer employed at the 
laboratory. However, the state presented no evidence that they 
22 
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had made any effort whatsoever to locate Stacey Szarek. Indeed, 
neither the state had not even attempted to obtain Stacey 
Szarek's name until after the first day of trial. Nevertheless, 
even if the state had presented evidence sufficent for the court 
to find that Stacey Szarek was unavailable to testify, the court 
could not have concluded that the other five individuals were 
constitutionally unavailable to testify. In the proffer made by 
the state, the court received information that the other five 
individuals were at the laboratory on the day of trial and could 
be called to testify. The state indicated that requiring the 
five individuals to testify would negatively impact the ability 
of the laboratory to run effectively on that day. (R. Vol. II, 
11, 12-19) . When considered in context with a defendant's right 
to confrontaion, it seems that the loss of a person's liberty for 
up to 15 years certainly outwieghs any inconvience the laboratory 
may have experienced by losing the work product of five people 
for a few hours. 
In addition to the unavailability of the witnesses, the 
Brooks court considered whether the witnesses prior testimony 
bore a sufficient indicia of reliability. The Brooks court 
considered the fact that the prior statements of the witnesses 
had been given at a preliminary hearing under oath. Id., at 540. 
Moreover, the Brooks court considered the fact that at the 
preliminary hearing the defendant had, " . . .a statutory right 
to cross-examine the witness against him, and the right to 
subpoena and present witnesses in his defense." Id. 
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Unlike the Byppkg case, in the present case, the six missing 
witnesses did not testify to the test results while under oath at 
a preliminary hearing. The missing witnesses prior statements 
simply consisted of writings on a sheet of paper. Moreover, 
Gracia, unlike Brooks did not have an opportunity to cross 
examine the witnesses at a preliminary hearing. In fact, the 
actual names of the individuals who handled the urine specimen in 
the laboratory were not provided to Gracia until the morning of 
the second day of trial. (R. Vol. II, 6, 10-25, 7-14). 
In sum, the court did not make the legal determinations 
required by Ohio v. Roberts, and State v. Brooks, to overcome a 
defendants right to confrontation. The court did not determine 
that the six people who tested and handled the urine specimen 
were unavailable testify. Nor did the court determine that the 
hearsay information bore the sufficient indicia of reliability. 
Therefore the trial court deprived Graica of his right to 
confrontation by allowing the laboratory test results to be 
received by the jury through hearsay information. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY ALLOWING 
LABORATORY TEST RESULTS TO BE ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE 
WITHOUT HAVING EVIDENCE WHICH THE COURT COULD CONSIDER 
IN DETERMINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE 
CUSTODY OF THE SPECIMEN AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF TAMPERING 
Gracia contends that the trial court erred as a matter of 
law by allowing the test results to be admitted into evidence 
when the only evidence the court considered in determining the 
24 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
circumstances surrounding the custody of the urine specimen and 
the likelihood of tampering was inadmissable hearsay. 
Before a substance connected with the commission of a crime 
is admissible as evidence, there must be a showing that the 
proposed exhibit is what it purports to be and is in 
substantially the same condition as it was at the time of the 
crime. State v. Madsen, 28 Utah 108, 110-111, 498 P.2d 670, 672 
(1972). The circumstances surrounding the custody of the article 
and the likelihood of tampering are factors to be considered in 
determining admissibility. Id. Nevertheless, a party proffering 
evidence is not required to eliminate every conceivable 
possibility that the evidence may have been altered. State v. 
Bradshaw, 680 P.2d 1036, 1040 (Utah 1984). Nor is every person 
who handled a specific piece of evidence required to testify in 
order for a party to establish a chain of custody. State V, 
Wynia, 754 P.2d 667 (Utah App. 1988). Evidence is generally 
presumed to have been handled with regularity once it is in the 
hands of the state absent a showing of bad faith or actual 
tampering. State v,, Eagle Book, Inc., 583 P.2d 73, 75 (Utah 
1978) . 
Previously the courts have held that a court could make a 
determination that a specimen was in substantially the same 
condition as at the time the crime was committed even though 
every person who handled the substance did not testify. Wynia at 
669. However, in these previous cases persons who handled an 
opened sample and actually performed the tests have always been 
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present and have testified. See, State v. Madsen. 28 Utah 108, 
110-111, 498 P.2d 670, 672 (1972); State v. Bradshaw. 680 P.2d 
1036, 1040 (Utah 1984); State V, Wynia. 754 P.2d 667 (Utah App. 
1988) . 
In Wynia this court held that sufficient facts had been 
presented by the state for the court to make its determination 
when the technician who actually received the sample into the 
state crime lab did not testify. Wynia, at 669. Unlike Wynia 
however, in the present case, there were six people who actually 
handled an opened urine specimen once it was received at the 
laboratory. (R. Vol. II, 6-9) In Wynia, the person who checked 
the unopened sample into the laboratory did not testify. 
Nevertheless, the two people who actually handled the opened 
sample and performed the test did testify. Id., at 669. In 
contrast to Wynia, in the present case six people handled an 
opened sample and did not testify. In particular, Stacey Szarek 
and Stephanie Brown who received the specimen from the probation 
officer, broke the seal and who poured off aliquots, did not 
testify. Unlike the missing link in Wynia, these two people 
handled an opened sample. Likewise, the two people who actually 
performed the initial test, Maria Chacon and Glenn Eleridge, were 
not called by the state to testify. Additionally, the two people 
who placed the specimen in the gas chromatograph mass 
spectrometer, Charles Jones, and Aiping Liu, were not called by 
the state to testify. The only information the court recieved 
upon which it could rely in determining the conditions 
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surrounding the custody of the specimen and the liklihood of 
tampering was hearsay testimony the court recieved from Gordon 
Nielson, the laboratory supervisor. Gordeon Nielson had no 
personal knowledge of the specimen or the tests performend on the 
specimen. The only knowledge Gordon Nielson had was hearsay 
information he read from a document. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court held in State V. Bradshaw 
that the state must not eliminate every concievable possibility 
that a substance may have been altered, Bradshaw, is 
distinguishable from the present case because the chemist who 
actually tested the substance was called upon to testify. 
Bradshaw, at 1040. Unlike Bradshaw, in the present case the 
state's only witness was Gordon Nielson, the lab supervisor who 
never handled the specimen. Bradshaw is further distinguishable 
from the present case because in Bradshaw the substance was in a 
sealed envelope the entire time it was unattended. Id.. at 1039. 
Unlike the sealed envelope in Bradshaw, the specimen in the 
present case was opened and handled by six people who did not 
testify. Moreover, the sample in the present case was left 
opened and unattended for a substantive period of time. Gordon 
Nielson testified that a shift change took place where Charles 
Jones replaced Aiping Liu. When this shift change occurred an 
unopened aliquot of the specimen was on the gas chromatograph 
machine. (R. Vol II 13, 21-25, 14, 1-10). The state did not 
present any witnesses who could testify how long the sample was 
unattended or who in the laboratory had access to the opened 
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sample. Hence, in the present case the specimen was opened and 
unattended while the specimen in Bradshaw. was unattended but 
remained in a sealed envelope. 
Although, the courts of this state have allowed a link in 
the chain of custody to be missing and a sealed sample to be left 
unattended while in a locked mailbox, the court in the present 
case has gone far beyond the prior case law and allowed test 
results to be recieved into evidence when the person who tested 
the specimen did not tesify. The trial court's ruling in the 
present case seems to surpass the outer limit that this state's 
courts have allowed previously. 
Because the state did not present any evidence except 
hearsay, the court did not have sufficent information to 
determine the circumstances surrounding the custody of the 
specimen in this case or the liklihood of tampering. Therefore, 
the court erred as a matter of law in admitting the laboratory 
test results performed on the urine specimen into evidence.
 i 
IV. EVEN IF THE COURT HAD SUFFICENT INFORMATION TO 
DETERMINE THE CIRCUMSTANCES SUROUNDING THE CUSTODY OF 
THE SPECIMEN AND THE LIKLIHOOD OF TAMPERING, THE COURT i 
ABUSED ITS DESCRETION BY ALLOWING THE TEST RESULTS INTO 
EVIDENCE 
Even if the hearsay evidence presented by the state was 
sufficent for the court to consider the circumstances surrounding 
the custody of the urine specimen and the liklihood of tampering, 
the court abused its discretion by allowing the test results into 
evidence when the six people in the lab who handled and tested 
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the specimen did not testify. 
Generally, an abuse of discretion occurs when the trial 
court's ruling was "beyond the limits of reasonability." State 
v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239 (Utah 1992). 
In the present case the trial court's ruling was beyond the 
limits of reasonability. On the first day of trial the state 
presented only one witness, Gordon Nielson, to testify concerning 
the circustances surrounding the custody of the specimen and the 
liklihood of tampering. This witness wa a laboratory supervisor 
who had never touched or tested the urine specimen. Upon Gracia1s 
objection and based upon his inquiries the state indicated that 
there were three people who had handled the specimen while it was 
in the laboratory. However, the state did not know the names of 
these individuals, their qualifications, or any other information 
regarding their behavior on the day the test was performed. 
Following Gracia's objection, the court told the state that "it 
would be in their best interest" to secure the presence of the 
missing individuals in order to establish a chain of custody. 
On the morning of the second day of trial the state provided 
the names of six individuals who had handled and tested the urine 
specimen in the laboratory. This was the first time Gracia had 
been provided with the names of the individuals who had handled 
the specimen. (R. Vol. II, 6, 10-25, 7-14) . Additionally, this 
was the first time Gracia had been told that six rather than 
three individuals had handled the specimen. The state proffered 
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to the court that five of the six witnesses could be located at 
the laboratory. (R. Vol. II, 10,3-25; 11, 1-15). The one 
witness who the state had not located, Stacey Szarek, was no 
longer employed at the laboratory. However, the state had not 
even attempted to procure Stacey Szarek1s name until after the 
first day of trial. Nevertheless, even if Stacey Szarek could 
not be found, the court was unreasonable in admitting laboratory 
test results through hearsay rather than requiring the five 
individuals whose whereabouts were known to testify. The court 
concluded that requiring the five individuals to testify would 
negatively impact the ability of the laboratory to run 
effectively on that day, therefore hearsay testimony from the 
laboratory supervisor would be sufficent to establish a chain of 
custody. (R. Vol. II, 11, 12-19). 
Considering all the circumstances, it is readily apparant 
that the court went beyond the limits of reasonability and abused 
its discretion when it determined that the risk of 
inconvienienceing a private laboratoy for a few hours outwieghed 
the risk that an innocent person could lose his liberty for up to 
15 years. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT'S ERROR IN ADMITTING THE TEST RESULTS 
INTO EVIDENCE WAS PREJUDICIAL AND RESULTED IN GRACIA'S 
CONVICTION 
Gracia contends that the court's error in admitting the 
laboratory test results was prejudicial. The state relied on the 
fact that cocaine was found in the urine sample to link Gracia to 
the bindles of cocaine which were found in the bathroom. The 
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State in their closing argument admitted that the labaratory test 
results were crucial to their case when they stated: 
"[Gracia] would have you believe that somebody planted [the 
drugs] there, but then there's the ultimate connection. And 
that is after all of that evidence was found, a urine sample 
was taken from the defendant, and it tested positive for 
cocaine. In addition to all of the things that were in his 
room, the cocaine was in him." 
(R. Vol. II 204, 22-25; 205, 1-3) 
Other testimony and evidence which was presented by the 
State to show that Gracia possessed the bindles of cocaine was 
shown by Gracia to be unreliable and biased. Both of the 
witnesses who told the police officers that they had seen Gracia 
attempt to flush the drugs down the toilet were related to 
Russell Allen. It was shown by Gracia that Russel Allen had made 
threats against Gracia. Additionally, Russell Allen had a motive 
to frame Gracia because Gracia had threatened to report Russell 
Allen to the Internal Revenue Service. (R. Vol II 146-147). And 
Russell Allen would have been in danger of losing his business. 
In fact, Rusell Allen had previously been convicted of disorderly 
conduct for making threats against Gracia. (R. 159-161). Part 
of the court record in the disorderly conduct trial against 
Russell Allen was a statement made by Allen that "the only thing 
[Allen] wanted was to see [Gracia] go to prison for his cocaine 
drug charges." (R. 161, 12-24). Allen also stated he would do 
anything within his power to keep his trucks going. (R. Vol. II 
147, 8-19) . 
Scott Allen, one of the two witnesses who said he saw Gracia 
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throw the cocaine into the toilet was Russell Allen's younger 
brother. Scott Allen, lied on the stand about making threats 
towards Gracia. He adamantly denied making threats on three 
different ocasions while under cross examination. However, 
after hearing his voice played to the jury on a cassette tape, 
Scott Allen admitted he had called Gracia and made threats on his 
answering machine. (R. Vol II 131-133) 
The other witness who said he saw Gracia attempt to flush 
the cocaine down the toilet, Mark Harris, was a brother-in-law to 
Russell Allen. Moreover, Mark Harris did not have an opportunity 
to observe Gracia when in the bathroom because Harris' view was 
obstructed by both Scott Allen and Gracia. (R. 224-230) . 
Because the witnesses had a motive to lie and the 
credibility of the witnesses was impeached, the fact that a urine 
test indicating that Gracia had cocaine in his system was 
extremely prejudicial to Gracia's case. 
Gracia had not previously planned on testifying in his own 
behalf and decided that it would be neccesary to testify so that 
he could explain the test results following the court's decision 
to admit the test results into evidence. Furthermore, when the 
court admitted the test results into evidence, the jury also 
learned the prejudicial fact that Gracia was on probation for a 
prior crime. 
The fact that the laboratory test results were prejudical to 
Gracia"s case is further demonstrated by the fact that the jury 
deliberated for approximately three hours prior to convicting 
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Gracia notwithstanding the fact that the test results were 
admitted into evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred as a matter of law by allowing hearsay 
information regarding laboratory test results performed on a 
urine specimen to be admitted into evidence. In admitting such 
hearsay information into evidence the trial court deprived Gracia 
of his right to confrontation as provided by the Sixth amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States and Article I section 12 
of the Constitution of Utah. The trial court also erred as a 
matter of law in allowing the test results to be admitted into 
evidence without determining the circumstances surrounding the 
custody of the urine specimen and the likelihood of tampering. 
If the hearsay evidence was sufficient for the court to consider 
the circumstances surrounding the custody of the urine specimen 
and the likelihood of tampering, the court abused its discretion. 
The errors or abuses by the court were prejudicial because 
the State relied on the hearsay information so that they could 
argue to the jury that cocaine was found in Gracia's urine and 
therefore Gracia was guilty of possessing other bindles of 
cocaine when other testimony and evidence which connected Gracia 
to the bindles of cocaine was shown by Gracia to be unreliable 
and biased. 
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WHEREFORE, defendant requests this court to reverse 
appellant conviction and remand for a new trial. 
DATED this day of December, 1998 
RICHARD P. Gal* 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
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.^ijfe 
78-2-3 JUDlSlAlJdODE 482 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review 
of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under 
Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court, of record 
holding a statute of. .the United States or this state 
unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the 
United State&or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) mterlbcutorjLappeals from any court of record in-
volving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from thedistrict court involving a conviction 
ofa first degree or capital felony; 
(j) orders, xhdgments, and" decrees of any court of 
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have 
original'appellate jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, 
or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Ap-
peals any* of the matters over which the Supreme Court has 
original appellate jurisdiction, except: 
:(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an inter-
locutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a 
capital felony; 
:
 (b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election* districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) 
•«-'  through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or 
denying" a petition for writ of certiorari for the review of a 
Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall 
review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under 
Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements 
of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative 
proceedings. 1996-
78-2-3. Repealed. 1986 
78-2-4. Supreme Court—Rulemaking , judges pro tem-
pore, and practice of law. 
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and 
evidence for use in the courts of the state and shall by rule 
manage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend 
the rules of procedure and evidence adopted by the Supreme 
Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses 
of the Legislature. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Constitution, 
the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and 
judges and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties. 
Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United States, 
Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah. 
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the practice of 
law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and 
discipline of persons admitted to the practice of law. 1986 
78-2-5. Repealed. 1988 
78-2-6. Appellate court administrator. 
The appellate court administrator shall appoint clerks and 
support staff as necessary for the operation of the Supreme 
Court and the Court of Appeals. The duties of the clerks and 
support staff shall be established by the appellate court 
administrator, and powers established by rule of the Supreme 
Court. 1986 
78-2-7. Repealed. 1986 
78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court. 
The court may at any time require the attendance and 
services of any sheriff in the state. 1988 
"•'•'• CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OE APPEALS 
m 
Section., 
78-2arL 
78-2a-2. 
78-2a-3. 
78-2a-4. 
78-2a-5. 
^Creation — SeaL 
Number of judges 
Filing fees. 
Court of Appeals jurisdiction. • 
Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
Location of Court of Appeals. 
— Terms — Functions —'.* 
~-U 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed. 1986,1988 
78-2a-l. Creation — SeaL 
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals is a court of record and shall have a seaL 
. 1986 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — 
Filing fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term 
of appointment to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is 
until the first general election held more than three years 
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the 
term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and 
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the 
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed 
and. qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of Appeals*; 
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or 
fraction thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in 
panels of three judges. Assignment to panels shall be by 
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a 
chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presid-
ing judge from among the members of the court by majority 
vote of all judges. The term of office of the presiding judge is 
two years and until a successor is elected. A presiding judge oF 
the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than two 
successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity 
of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of 
presiding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of 
Appeals. In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of 
Appeals, the presiding-judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of 
Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court 
and the Judicial Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for 
the Supreme Court. 1988 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all ex- „ 
traordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
; (a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and de-
crees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. - 1 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, includ-1 
ing jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, oven : -
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formaT 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from . 
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceed-^ 
ings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commis-^ 
sion, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire 
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©? 
anions 
d State Lands actions.reviewed by the executive direc-
o£ the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, 
s, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
3> appeals from the district court review of: 
"v. (i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and 
~(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 
r63-46a-12.1; .. .^ ._. 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals^from any court of record in 
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first 
'egree or capital felony; 
v (e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, 
those involving a conviction of a first degree or 
I felony; * 
v;(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary 
3 sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving 
L y other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting 
^challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first 
egree or capital'felony; •' "•• 
appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordi-
writs challenging the decisions of the Board of 
and Parole except in cases involving a first 
_egree or capital felony; 
f"- (h) appeals from district court involving domestic rela-
3 cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annul-
t, property division, child custody, support, visitation, 
doption, and paternity; 
Hi} appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
*(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the 
Supreme Court. - v 
/the Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by 
vote of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme 
for original appellate review and determination any 
rover which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
liction. 
The Court of Appeals shall comply with the require-
" ts of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures 
; in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 1996 
2a-4. Rev iew of act ions by Supreme Court* 
dew of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of 
shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the 
ae Court. 1986 
2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals . 
e Court of Appeals has its principal location in Salt Lake 
'^The Court of Appeals may perform any of its functions in 
location within the state. 1986 
-ciiU CHAPTER 3 
^ D I S T R I C T COURTS 
o n " - : " . / • " :" ' ' * • ' • . 
^ 1 to 78-3-2: Repealed. 
•&. . Term of judges — Vacancy. 
Jurisdiction—Appeals: 
Repealed. 
-6. Terms — Minimum of once quarterly. 
-7 to 78-3-11. Repealed. 
-11.5. State District Court Administrative System. 
-12. Repealed. 
3-12.5., Costs of system. 
3-13. Repealed. 
3-13.4. Transfer of court operating responsibilities -
Section. .^ .1^.l. . w _._...... : --, .-.c ...-,,..,•_. ni± ^ T 
78-3-15 to 78-3-17. Repealed. ...... - ; j ^ a ; f ^ 
78-3-17.5. . -Application of savings accruing to counties. 
78-3-18. ... Judicial Administration Act — Short title. 
78-3-19. . . . Purpose of act. - .• :* ^>T:> 
78-3-20. Definitions. : - . '. .? 
78-3-21. Judicial Council — Creation — Members — 
Terms and election — Responsibilities — 
~. ... Reports. ..-.•.;-_ ~, .- .-..•;•-* 
78-3-21.5. - Databases for judicial boards. 
78-3-22. Presiding officer — Compensation — Duties. 
78-3-23. Administrator of the courts — Appointment — 
Qualifications — Salary. 
78-3-24. Court administrator — Powers, duties, and 
responsibilities. 
78-3-25. Assistants for administrator of the courts — 
Appointment of trial court executives. 
78-3-26. Courts to provide information and statistical 
data to administrator of the courts. 
78-3-27. Annual judicial conference. 
78-3-28. Repealed. 
78-3-29. Presiding judge — Associate presiding judge— 
Election—Term—Compensation—Powers 
— Duties. 
78-3-30. Duties of the clerk of the district court- , 
78-3-31. Court commissioners — Qualifications — Ap-
pointment — Functions governed by rule. 
78-3-1 to 78-3-2- Repealed. 1971, 1981,1968 
78-3-3. Term of j u d g e s — V a c a n c y . 
Judges of the district courts shall be appointed initially 
until the first general election held more than three years 
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the 
term of office for judges of the district courts is six years, and 
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the 
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed 
and qualified. 1968 
78-3-4. J u r i s d i c t i o n — A p p e a l s . 
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters 
civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and 
not prohibited by law. 
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary 
writs and other writs necessary to carry into eflfect their 
orders, judgments, and decrees. 
(3) The district court has jurisdiction over matters of law-
yer discipline consistent with, the rules of the Supreme Court. 
(4) The district court has jurisdiction over all matters 
properly filed in the circuit court prior to July 1 ,1996. 
(5) The district court has appellate jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate trials de novo of the judgments of the justice court and of 
the small claims department of the district court.
 v; 
(6) Appeals from the final orders, judgments, and decrees of 
the district court are under Sections 78-2-2 and 78-2a-3. 
(7) The district-court has jurisdiction to review agency 
adjudicative proceedings as set forth in Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act, and shall comply with the 
requirements of that chapter, in its review of agency adjudi-
cative proceedings. .:••>.. 
(8) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the district court has 
subject matter jurisdiction in class B misdemeanors,, class C 
misdemeanors, infractions, and violations of ordinances only 
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AMENDMENT I AMENDMENT VIIL - • ^?nfc 
[Religious and political freedom.] 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting; the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or ofthe press; or the right ofthe people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances: 
AMENDMENT II 
[Right to bear arms.] 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a 
free State, the right ofthe people to keep and bear Arms, shall 
not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT m 
[Quartering soldiers.] 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, 
without the consent ofthe Owner, nor in time of war, but in a 
manner to be prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENTIV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right ofthe people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due pro-
cess of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature, and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses.in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VH 
[Trial by jury in civil cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise 
re-examined in any Court ofthe United States, than according 
to the rules of the common law. 
[Bail—Punishment.] . .. . - ^ 
Excessive bail shall not be required", nor excessive- ones 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 'j£2' 
AMENDMENTS ...*, ;. * , ; .~ : ^ 
[Rights retained by people.] ' ••• ' . .~X 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights", shall 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people. 
AMENDMENT X 
[Powers reserved to states or people.] 
The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States respectively, or to the people. 
AMENDMENT XI ? 
[Suits against states — Restriction of judicial power.] 
The judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of 
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. 
AMENDMENT XII 
[Election of President and Vice-President.] 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote 
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at 
least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with 
themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted 
for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as I 
Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all per- I 
sons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as i 
Vice-President, and ofthe number of votes for each, which lists 1 
they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of I 
the Government of the United States, directed to the Presi- I 
dent of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall, in the I 
presence ofthe Senate and House of Representatives, open all 1 
the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The ] 
person having the greatest number of votes for President, \ 
shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the j 
whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have j 
such majority, then from the persons having the highest 9 
numbers not* exceeding three on the list of those voted for as j 
President, the House of Representatives shall choose immedi- j 
ately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, 
the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from 
each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall 
consist of a member or members from two-thirds ofthe states, 
and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. 
And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a 
President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon 
them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the 
'Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case ofthe 
death or other constitutional disability of the President—The 
person having, the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, 
shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority ofthe 
whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a 
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the 
Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the 
purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of 
Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be 
necessary to a choice.J3ut no person constitutionally ineligible 
to the office of President shall be ehgibleto that of Vice-
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substantial evidence to support the charge and the court 
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person 
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person 
or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of 
the court if released on bail. 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal 
only as prescribed by law. 1988 (2nd as.) 
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punish-
ments.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not 
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be 
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor. 1896 
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate. In capital cases the jury shall consist of twelve 
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of 
no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature 
shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event 
shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal 
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-
fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases 
shall be waived unless demanded. 1996 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress o f injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is 
a pa r ty . 1896 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any 
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to ad-
. vance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. 
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of that examination is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided.by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall pre-
clude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute 
or rule in whole or in part a t any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant i f appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by statute or rule. 1994 
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indic tment — 
Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indict-
ment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination 
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be 
waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by 
indictment, with or without such examination and commit-
ment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and 
S e c 14. [Unreasonable searches' forbidden — Issu-
ance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,, houses, - I 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 1 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon j 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly * | 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to 
be seized r 189*. 
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of 
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the 
truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall 
appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, 
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, 
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the1 right 
to determine the law and the fact.. 1896 
S e c 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of 
absconding debtors. 1896 
S e c 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] -
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military, 
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the 
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, may vote at their 
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be 
prescribed by law. 1896 
S e c 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing; 
contracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the 
obligation-of contracts shall be passed. 1896 
S e c 19. [Treason defined — Proof:] 
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war 
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid 
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on 
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act. 1896 
S e c 20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil 
power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in 
any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war 
except in a manner to be prescribed by law. 1896 
S e c 21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been, duly 
convicted, shall exist within this State. 1896 
S e c 22. [Private property for public use.] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation. 1896 
S e c 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise, 
privilege or immunity. ' r-;a 1896 
- \" :\j :'.' • : - - . . - .;•* JI 
S e c 24. [Uniform: operation: of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation* 
•• '•'.' 1896 
S e c 25. [Rights retained by people.] 
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair 
or deny others retained by the people. 1896 
S e c 26. [Provis ions mandatory and prohibitory.]; 
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and 
prohibitory, unless by express words thev are declared to h» 
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have opportunity to participate. A witness so appointed shall 
advise the parties of the witness' findings, if any; the witness' 
deposition may be taken by any party; and the witness may be 
called to testify by the court or any party. The witness shall be 
subject to aross-examination by each: party, including a party 
calling the witness. 
(b) Compensation. Expert witnesses so appointed are enti-
tled to reasonable compensation in whatever sum the court 
may allow. The compensation thus fixed is payable from funds 
which may be provided by law in criminal cases and civil 
actions and proceedings involving just compesation under the 
Fifth Amendment. In other civil actions and proceedings the 
compesation shall be paid by the parties in such proportion 
and at such time as the court direct, and thereafter charged in 
like manner as other costs. 
(c) Disclosure of appointment. In the exercise of its discre-
tion, the court may authorize disclosure to the jury of the fact 
that the court appointed the expert witness. 
(d) Parties' experts of own selection. Nothing in this rule 
limits the parties in calling expert witnesses of their own 
selection. 
ARTICLE V m . HEARSAY 
Rule 801. Definitions. 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement. A "statement^ is (1) an oral or written asser-
tion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by 
the person as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a 
statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay* is a statement, other than one made 
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, 
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not 
hearsay if: 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the 
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning 
the statement and the statement is (A) inconsistent with the 
declarant's testimony or the witness denies having made the 
statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the declar-
ant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied 
charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper 
influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person 
made after perceiving the person; or 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered 
against a party and is (A) the party's own statement, in either 
an individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement 
of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its 
truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party 
to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a state-
ment by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter 
within the scope of the agency or employment, made during 
the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a 
coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance 
of the conspiracy. 
Rule 802. Hearsay rule. 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by 
these rules. 
Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant 
immaterial. 
The following are not excluded bv the hearsav rule, even 
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or 
explaining an event or condition made while the declarant T _ 
perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter?: 
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling: 
event or condition made while the declarant was under the 
stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. ,T 
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. 
A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind; 
emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan,, 
motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but 
not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact 
remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, 
revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will. .;" 
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treat- J 
ment. Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or 
treatment and describing medical history, or past or present 
symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general . 
character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as 
reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. -, 
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record con-
cerning a matter about which a witness once had knowledge 
but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to 
testify fully and accurately, shown to have been made or 
adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the 
witness' memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If 
admitted, the memorandum or record may be read into 
evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless 
offered by an adverse party. 
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, 
report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, 
events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the 
time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with 
knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted 
business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that 
business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or 
data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custo-
dian or other qualified witness, unless the source of informa-
tion or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate 
lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this 
paragraph includes business, institution, association, profes-
sion, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not 
conducted for profit. 
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the 
provisions of paragraph (6). Evidence that a matter is not 
included in the memoranda, reports, records, or data compi-
lations, in any form, kept in accordance with the provisions of 
Paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of 
the matter; if the matter was of a kind of which a memoran-
dum, report, record, or data compilation was regularly made 
and preserved, unless the sources of information or other 
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, state-
ments, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or 
agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, 1 
or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by Daw as to* | 
which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, 1 
in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other j 
law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceed- J 
ings and against the Government in criminaT cases, factual 1 
findings resulting^ from an investigation made pursuant to ^ 
authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or j 
other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. i 
(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data compilations, A 
in any form, of births, fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the * 
report thereof was made to a public office pursuant to require- 3 
ments of law. <] 
(10) Absence of public record or entry. Tb prove the absence | 
of a record, rpnortr sfjjtpmpnf nr- Hn+a rwnn«ila+i*vn J« o««r * 
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